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UNIONIZED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: AN ARGUMENT FOR
INCLUSION UNDER THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
DANIEL P. SULLIVAN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1959, after extensive investigations of the labor and management
fields, the Congress of the United States discovered numerous instances
of corruption, breaches of trust and disregard of the individual rights of
a significant portion of the national labor force.' These investigations
revealed continuing failures to observe high standards of responsibility
and ethical conduct. Supplementary legislation was required to insure the
necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and also the
public in general as its interests are affected by the activities of labor
organizations, employers, labor relations consultants and their officers
and representatives.2 Congress, therefore, adopted the Landrum-Griffin
Act in order to eliminate and prevent further improper practices on the
part of those factions of organized labor which had distorted and defeated
the policies of the Taft-Hartley and the Railway Labor Acts resulting
in the obstruction and interruption of commerce by:
1) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instru-
mentalities of commerce; 2) occurring in the current of com-
merce; 3) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the
flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods into
or from the channels of commerce, or the prices of such mater-
ials or goods in commerce; or 4) causing diminution of em-
ployment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair
or disrupt the market for goods flowing into or from the chan-
nels of commerce.'
In order to promote the welfare of national commerce and union
democracy, Congress, as a matter of public interest and responsibility,
included a "bill of rights" for the members of labor organizations in the
* Editor, Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.
1. In 1959 there were 17,117,000 union members in a national work force of
70,921,000. Thus, the union members made up 24.1 percent of the work force. BNA,
Union Membership Increases i.i Million Since r964; A.F.G.E. Reports 44.1 Percent
Boost; A.F.S.C.M.E. 19.8 Percent, 209 Gov'r EMPLOYEE RELATIONS RPTs. C-1, Sept. 11,
1967.
2. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 2, 29 U.S.C. §
401 (b) (1965).
3. Id. at § 401(c).
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Landrum-Griffin Act.4 Thus, labor organizations, their officers and
employees and employers were required to file reports such as annual
financial reports indicating their compliance with their respective obliga-
tions under the Act.' The Act established trusteeships which could be
used to terminate unlawful acts of a union local's executive board6 and
provided rules governing election procedures, including standards of
conduct for labor elections.7 Safeguards were also imposed for the
benefit of labor organization members by articulating the fiduciary re-
sponsibilities of labor organizations and their officers.8
There seems to be some question, however, as to whether govern-
mental employees9 come within the Act1" even though potential injury
may be present. Several reasons were suggested for excluding govern-
mental employees from the Act. First, they would be victimized by an
inequitable statutory arrangement whereby such employees would be
subject to federal regulations and controls without being extended the
benefits and rights enjoyed by other types of labor organizations under
federal law such as the right to organize and bargain collectively.1'
Secondly, and even more important than the elimination of an unjusti-
4. Id. at § 411-15. This was not the first effort to pass this type of legislation.
The Trade Unions Funds Protection Act of 1869 entitled "An Act to protect the funds
of trade unions from embezzlement and misappropriation" was passed as a result of the
decisions in Hornly v. Close, L.R. 2 Q.B. 153 (1867) and Farrer v. Close, L.R. 4 Q.B.
602 (1869), which held that a trade union unlawfully restraining trade could not avail
itself of the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act § 24 (1855) to prosecute union of-
ficials for fraud. The 1869 Act reversed both decisions by providing that associations
whose rules might operate in restraint of trade should not be deemed, for the purposes
of the Friendly Societies Act, to be societies established for illegal purposes. CITRINE,
TRADE UNION LAW 225 (1967). This function is currently filled by the Trade Union
Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31, §§ 1-24, as amended, Trade Union Act of 1964. The
Act "apparently applies to public employees since the Ministers of Labour have con-
sidered all employed persons to be under it." CITRINE, TRADE UNION LAw 403 (1967).
5. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 201, 29 U.S.C. §§
431-40 (1964). Legislation of this nature is by no means new.
6. Id. at §§ 461-66.
7. Id. at §§ 481-83.
8. Id. at § 501.
9. A substantial number of AFL-CIO, Teamsters and United Auto Workers are
governmental employees. For example, the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (A.F.S.C.M.E.) is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and recently a
Michigan road commission was ordered to bargain with a Teamsters local. BNA,
Michigan Board Orders Sanilac County Road Commission to Bargain with Teamsters,
188 GOV'T EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP. B-1 (April 1967).
10. See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text. It can be argued that they
should be included because of the broadening scope of recently enacted labor laws
which have included public employees, their indirect inclusion in practice and the dif-
ficulty in regulating Landrum-Griffin type conduct apart from the Act.
11. DiviSION OF LAW, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LA-
BOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 1959 483-84 (1959); Cf. Sullivan,
How Can the Problem of the Public Employee Strike Be Resolved?, 19 OKLA. L. REv.
365 (1966).
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fiable inequity, is the need for vindicating a fundamental principle of a
healthy democratic society-the existence and continued development of
genuinely voluntary social organizations, not dependent on government
and free from governmental regulation. Government employee labor
unions meet every definitional test of a genuinely voluntary, private
association. They have absolutely no power, statutory, economic or
otherwise, to compel anyone to join or remain members of their as-
sociation. They are completely dependent upon the voluntary support of
their members for continued existence and in turn must justify such
support by continuing to serve their members. Any misconduct, derelic-
tion of duty or corruption is discouraged by assuring each member the
right to withdraw from the organization, thus cutting off the organiza-
tion's only source of revenue. As a result, it is practically impossible for
corruption, racketeering and gangsterism to gain a foothold within the
organization."2 After the investigations of 1959, Congress failed to
discover a single instance in which the above evils existed in a govern-
mental employee's union and were reliably informed that a government
union had never imposed a trusteeship over a local.' Since 1959,
however, trusteeships have been imposed on local unions,' 4 a development
that reaffirms the maxim that legislation, no matter how comprehensive,
cannot anticipate all of the future changes which may occur in a relation-
ship." Furthermore, public employee unions at the state and local levels
now enjoy substantial collective bargaining rights, 6 and federal employees
enjoy certain privileges which are implemented on a voluntary basis."
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the possible application of the
Landrum-Griffin Act to government employees in light of labor develop-
ments that have occurred in the past decade.
APPLICABILITY OF LANDRUM-GRIFFIN TO
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Direct Inclusion
The United States Government, including any corporation wholly
owned by the Government, and any state or political subdivision, is
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. An example of this occurred recently in Georgia where a trusteeship was re-
quired for the DeKalb Education Association. NAT'L EDUc. ASS'N REP., Oct. 25, 1968,
at 1.
15. One need only glance at the present definition of what is included under the
commerce clause" of the United States Constitution for authority for this statement.
16. See Sullivan, supra note 11; Sullivan, The Supreme Court and Public Em-
ployee Collective Bargaining, 35 TENN. L. REv. 452 (1968).
17. Executive Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 631
(Supp. V, 1964).
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excluded from the definition of "employer" in the Landrum-Griffin Act.'"
The Act does not exclude states or political subdivisions which wholly
own corporations. They may be excluded, however, merely by the fact
that they are owned by the state or its political subdivision. Because this
article will cover all government operations, no specific discussion will
cover this peculiar statutory omission.
The government is generally regarded as not being covered by an
act whether that act specifically excludes or includes the government. 9
Therefore, the fact that the government was not specifically excluded
under the Railway Labor Act apparently made no difference to the
United States Supreme Court which construed the Act as excluding
government employees.2" In litigation involving a state owned railroad,2 '
the Court held that the railroad was covered by the Act. The Court ruled
that it was necessary to bring this relationship within the regulatory
scheme of the Railway Labor Act in order to prevent labor disputes
which would incapacitate the railroad; uniformity of regulation was vital.
The underlying policy, the regulation of labor disputes, does not signifi-
cantly differ from the reasons for including the employees of other branches
of government. In the latter situation, however, the labor disputes are of
a more serious nature because they involve the dissemination of union
funds by illegal acts. This has the effect of destroying employee morale
which may result in a substandard work performance for the employer.
The disruptive effect of low morale among employees is substantially
more significant in public service than in the private sector since the
effectiveness of state services is essential to society.
The Government, at all levels, was excluded under the National
Labor Relations Act.22 Government exclusion remained unquestioned
some time after the adoption of the Act;23 however, in NLRB v. Local
313, IBEW24 a county was included within the coverage of the Act
under the term "person" and not "employer." The decision, which
18. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 3, 29 U.S.C. §
402 (e) (1965).
19. Miami Waterworks v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946).
20. This was precisely the point in California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). The
court made an exception to the rule in this case.
21. Id.
22. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1965).
23. E.g., Victor M. Sprys, 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
24. NLRB v. Local 313, IBEW, 254 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1958). Such an in-
clusion finds legislative approval in a large minority of states by general interpretive
provisions similar to those of Colorado, which states, "the word 'person' may extend
and be applied to body politics." SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6303 (3d
ed. 1943).
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reversed prior cases denying coverage, 5 was based upon recognized
public policy although the court failed to articulate that policy. The court's
rationale in ruling that the provision of the Act prohibits compulsory
unionism is analogous to the prohibition of criminal acts within a union
which could result in labor disputes that undermine employer-employee
relationships to the point that public interest is adversely affected. While
it appeared that Congress had excluded the Government, the court
reasoned that the argument against extending statutory protection to the
government employer was not persuasive where the underlying evil that
the Act was intended to remedy was present. The Landrum-Griffin Act
might be interpreted accordingly if the same evils were present and the
overriding need for remedial action was sufficient.
The analogy seems clear, and the Supreme Court" and the Fourth
Circuit 'Court of Appeals" have adopted this reasoning. In Potts v.
Hay" the Arkansas Supreme Court held that public employees specifically
excluded by a state labor act were still included within a provision of the
state constitution granting employees the right to work regardless of
whether or not they belonged to a union. The court held that a statute
prohibiting the employment of union members as policemen was un-
constitutional. Although public employees were not specifically mentioned,
the court included them within the purview of the constitution's right to
work provision. The issues of compulsory unionism and the right to work
were considered so important that the court ignored the well-settled rule
of statutory construction that a public employer is not included within
an act or constitutional provision unless specifically mentioned.29 The
nature of the underlying social benefit was of such significance that the
public employees were included within the protection of the provision.
The right to work without the imposition of compulsory union member-
ship seems of similar importance to the freedom to work without being
burdened by the disabilities alleviated by the Landrum-Griffin Act.
The analogy between the two situations indicates that public employees,
while excluded in name from several labor acts, are in fact included be-
cause of the judicial recognition that the protection of their rights is as
necessary as the protection of the nonpublic employee's rights. The
courts are finding that the public employee's inclusion was, in fact, in-
tended. An example of this recognition, although limited in nature, is the
25. See generally Note, Labor: Counties Recognized as "Persons" Under Taft Act,
10 HASTINGS L.J. 332 (1959).
26. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
27. NLRB v. Local 313, IBEW, 254 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1958).
28. 318 S.W.2d 826 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1958).
29. Miami Waterworks v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946).
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recent inclusion of certain classifications of public employees by an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act." While the determination
of public employees' wages is not significant for the purposes of this
article, it does indicate Congressional approval of the statutory regulation
of one aspect of the collective bargaining relationship. In addition, the
wage schedules not only affect employees of the federal government, but
those employed by the states as well.
Another question which arises and indicates the ambiguous nature
of current labor legislation is whether an employee is an employee in fact
or an independent contractor. In NLRB v. Howard Johnson,"' the court
held one party to be an independent contractor because he hired, fired and
paid employees and hence could not be an employee himself. Similarly,
it is not clear whether a party is an employer or a political subdivision.
The Fourth Circuit3 2 held that a party was an employer even though he
was involved in a nonprofit business incorporated under the Electric
Membership Corporation Act of North Carolina 3 and had obtained
substantial loans from the Rural Electrification Administration. The
ambiguous nature of the term "governmental unit" makes it extremely
difficult to define. The combination of definitional ambiguities, court
inclusion of employees based upon Congressional intent and the legislative
inclusion of some public employees within the labor acts would seem to
indicate a likelihood that those public employees suffering the disabilities
that Congress intended to alleviate in the Landrum-Griffin Act might
very well be covered by that Act.
Indirect Inclusion
While public employees have been specifically excluded from the
terms of the Landrum-Griffin Act, there are a number of public employee
unions whose ranks include nonpublic employees.84 When the nonpublic
30. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966 § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. 1967).
Prior to this amendment, section 204(d) excluded public employers, but the courts have
included them in certain cases. In Goldberg v. Nolla Galib & CIA, 291 F.2d 371, 373
(P.R. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1961), the court said, "[i]f employee's
activities otherwise involve them in Interstate Commerce, this chapter applies to them
even though the action is carried on by the government .... .. " Similarly, in Wirtz v.
R.E. Lee Elec. Co., 339 F.2d 686, 692 (4th Cir. 1964), the court said, "[i]f the in-
strumentality of facility is used for transportation, transmission or communication among
the states, then it is an instrumentality of commerce within this chapter although entirely
owned and operated by the federal government." This was followed in the Portal to
Portal Pay Act § 90, 29 U.S.C. § 262 (1965), which states that an "employer when
used in relation to F.L.S.A. in this act will mean the same thing as under F.L.S.A."
31. 317 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. NLRB v. Randolf Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 117-6 (1964).
34. The membership of A.F.S.C.M.E. in Detroit, Michigan, includes employees of
privately owned hospitals.
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members are injured by the public employee union's illegal use of union
funds, it would appear that they are protected by the Landrum-Griffin
Act since the injured employee is employed by a party who is not excluded
under the Act."3 Because each nonpublic employee member has been
injured through the misuse and commingling of dues and initiation fees
with the fees of public employee union members, an investigation of the
illegal acts necessarily includes an investigation of the public employee
union for violations of the Act."6 Although the illegal acts are committed
against private sector employees, the effect of the investigation procedure,
nevertheless, draws public employees under the provisions of the Act. 7
This procedure is presently being used by the Labor Management
Reports Office of the Department of Labor.3" Not only has the specific
wording of the law been avoided, but the intended sanctions may be
applied.
The need for this regulatory procedure in the public sector was
pointed out recently when it became necessary to expel a union for en-
gaging in alleged illegal activity. 9 A local police union had engaged in
a work stoppage and the lawfulness of the union act was determined
with finality by the International. While such conduct perhaps was not
illegal, the International was allowed to terminate the accrued rights of
the local without recourse under the Landrum-Griffin Act.4"
In another case a teachers' association local was ordered to show
cause why it should not be censured, suspended or expelled from the
National Education Association.41 The final determination of disciplinary
action to be taken belonged exclusively to the National Education As-
sociation. Again, the protection of the accrued rights was not available
to the employees under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
In both of these situations, however, recourse would have been
available if any of the local membership had been nonpublic employees.
35. This position is taken by the Office of Labor-Management Reports. Inter-
view by phone with Louis H. Woiwode, Area Director of Office of Labor-Management
Welfare and Pension Reports, Detroit, Michigan, Nov. 22, 1968. The same position is
taken by the A.F.S.C.M.E.:
This law (Landrum-Griffin) . . . is inapplicable to many of our local unions,
but it does cover locals which have memberships in the private or non-profit
sector, the councils with which they are affiliated, and the international union
is covered by it. It provides, among other things, for certain standards to be
maintained in safeguarding the rights of union members ...
A.F.S.C.M.E. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, MEMORANDUM, Jan. 10, 1966.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, July, 1967, at 4.
40. Id.
41. NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N REP., July 19, 1968, at 8; NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N REP., Oct. 25,
1968, at 1.
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While the rights affected were not as substantial as those which brought
about the passage of the Act,"2 the absence of this type of control over a
labor organization which has the benefit of initiation fees and dues allows
union leaders to arbitrarily expel any member that might question the
disbursement policies of the union."
Public employee unions having nonpublic employee members are
brought within the Landrum-Griffin Act because of their operational
structure. Their activities are so interrelated that it becomes difficult to
distinguish whose dues are spent on particular union functions. Since the
same commingling takes place in private sector unions, they would have
the duty to meet the requirements of the Act regarding members who are
public employees." Because the reporting requirements may also include
this situation, the State of Michigan had five public employee unions
reporting to the Office of Labor Management Reports under the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act in 1964." If such an interpretation of the Act is
followed by the Office of Labor Management Reports and compliance
occurs as a matter of practice, it would seem that the Act has become
applicable to public employees. Even though the clear intent of the Act
is to exclude public employers from the definition of the term "employer,"
it appears that the nonstatic purpose of the Act has been altered in
practice.
Stevens and Embry-Judicial Inaction
In Stevens v. Carey," a federal employee filed suit in a district court
under the Landrum-Griffin Act. The plaintiff in this action was employed
at Fort Benjamin Harrison, an Indiana facility operated by the Depart-
ment of Defense. She was a member of the American Federation of
Government Employees, a union representing certain employees at Fort
Benjamin Harrison and was also a duly elected member of the executive
committee of that union. The plaintiff had objected to certain proposed
amendments to the union's constitution and shortly thereafter was remov-
ed from the executive committee and suspended from the union. A hearing
was held which affirmed the removal and suspension. On appeal the
plaintiff alleged that her right of free speech was denied, that the union
constitution violated her procedural rights of due process and that the
defendant union failed to maintain fiscal integrity in conducting the
42. DIVISION OF LAW, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 11.
43. Embry v. Federation of State Employees, 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
44. See note 35 sup-ra.
45. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REGISTER OF REPORTING LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 137 (Jan.
1, 1964).
46. Civ. Action No. IP. 68-C. 453 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
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affairs of the union. It is in this posture that the litigation stands at the
time of this writing.
4 7
Many of the previous arguments for granting the federal employee
status under the Landrum-Griffin Act could be applied by the court in
the Steven's case. But whether they are applied or not, there seems to be
no question that the court will have to come to grips with the realities of
the employment relationship when considering the apparent statutory
exclusion of public employees. In this context, it is possible that the court
may find public employees indirectly included within the provisions of the
Act.
Part of Mrs. Steven's cause of action is based on "rights" granted by
Executive Order 10988.48 Such "rights," in all likelihood, may be
considered illusory since the court may not be willing to cross lines it has
refused to cross in the past. For example, one court has refused to enforce
certain "rights" created under the Executive Order because enforcement
would violate the separation of powers concept. 9 The judicial regulation
of employees hired by the executive branch would result in the regulation
of employment relationships within another governmental branch, a
function the court did not want to perform. Hence, any discussion of the
case will probably be centered around Landrum-Griffin rights and not
those "rights" set forth in Executive Order 10988.
While this may not be the first suit filed by a public employee under
the Landrum-Griffin Act,5" it graphically raises the issues under discus-
sion. To speculate whether the case will go any further than a motion for
dismissal under the public employer exclusion51 or whether the court will
fully discuss the issues raised in this article would be mere conjecture on
the part of this writer. It seems clear, however, that Stevens may provide
a forum for further discussion and consideration of the applicability of the
Act to the public employer-employee relationship. Unfortunately, no
answer has been filed5" to indicate what precise issues will be raised. It
47. The defendants filed an answer on Nov. 25, 1968, claiming that the court did
not have jurisdiction since the plaintiff had not exhausted the available administrative
remedies. Stevens v. Carey, Civ. Action File No. IP. 68-C-4 (S.D. Ind. 1968). The
remainder of the text discussing this case is still applicable since the issues raised may
still be litigated.
48. Executive Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 631
(Supp. V, 1964).
49. BNA, Court Affirms Ruling That Judiciary May Not Review Agency Applica-
tions of Executive Order io988, 267 GOVT EMPLOyEE RELATIONS REP. A-1 (Oct. 21,
1968).
50. Embry v. Federation of State Employees, 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
51. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 3, 29 U.S.C. §
402(e) (1964).
52. Letter from Irving L. Fink, Plaintiff's Counsel to Daniel P. Sullivan, Nov. 7,
1968.
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seems clear from the pleadings, however, that the court will have a broad
spectrum of issues with which to extend the law. If a motion to dismiss
without further pleadings is summarily granted by the court, the question,
for all intents and purposes, will remain unanswered since a motion to
dismiss is not conclusive as to all issues which might have been raised.
Therefore, the court may dismiss the case either because a public employee
has no cause of action and Executive Order 10988 is not controlling, or
the Bill of Rights section of the Landrum-Griffin Act is inapplicable.
While either might well be the conclusion of the court, without amend-
ment, any valid issues raised in the pleadings will remain dormant.
In 1966, a similar case answered one of the issues raised in
Stevens. In Embry v. Federation of State Employees," the plaintiff, a
member and officer of a public employee union, was charged with
misconduct. At a hearing on these charges he was found guilty not only
of misconduct but also of violations of the union's constitution. He was
then dismissed and suspended. 4 The plaintiff alleged that the dismissal
and suspension violated his rights under the Landrum-Griffin Act.5" The
defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction
because of the public employer exclusion in the Act. Plaintiff replied by
alleging that since a portion of the union membership consisted of
private sector employees, the Landrum-Griffin Act should be applicable
to the union." The court held 7 that the section of the Landrum-Griffin
Act dealing with the procedure that must be followed when a union
member is suspended applies only to members of labor organizations
included in the Act. Since labor organizations are covered only when they
deal with nonpublic employers, the motion to dismiss was granted. In
dismissing the action, the court also rejected the corollary argument that
if a public employee union also contains private sector employees, the
Act should be applicable. Appellate proceedings in the Fifth Circuit Court
were withdrawn after the district court's decision, 8 and the plaintiff
subsequently filed a libel action against the union for its charges of
misconduct in the original action.59
53. 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
54. Brief for the Appellant for the Judicial Panel of the Union, Embry v. Federa-
tion of State Employees, 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
55. Brief for Plaintiff, Embry v. Federation of State Employees, 64 L.R.R.M.
2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
56. Plaintiff's Brief on Motion to Dismiss, Embry v. Federation of State Em-
ployees, 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966). See also A.F.S.C.M.E. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 35.
57. Embry v. Federation of State Employees, 64 L.R.R.M. 2335 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
See note 102 infra.
58. Interview by phone with Howard Moore, Jr., Plaintiff's Counsel, Nov. 29, 1968.
59. Embry v. Federation of State Employees, Civ. Action No. B.23260 (Super. Ct.,
Fulton Cty., Ga., Sept. 13, 1966). Interview by phone with Howard Moore, Jr., Plain-
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At first it seems that Stevens and Embry might well lay the in-
clusion argument to rest. Since the dismissal in Embry merely dealt with
the employer exclusion, however, the possibility of extending the inter-
pretation of the term "employer" still exists. In addition, since the ap-
parent trend is toward including public employee unions which have priv-
ate sector employees within the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Embry decision
presents a conflict between the practice of the Labor Department and the
decisions of the United States district courts. The conflict necessitates
further clarification and may provide a basis for future adoption of the
inclusion argument. The Stevens case may present the opportunity for
clarification if it proceeds beyond a motion to dismiss.
Adequacy of Existing Remedies
An argument could be made that existing law, in certain regards,
is adequate to cope with the issue under consideration. Therefore, a pri-
vate union member may bring a mandamus action to force union officials
to produce their records without the aid of the Landrum-Griffin Act."0 In
Mooney v. Bartender's Union,61 the court analogized that since stock-
holders had a right to inspect company books, a similar right should be
accorded union members. The court reasoned that although unions
primarily benefit their membership, they also have a considerable impact
on the public, and the welfare of both would be promoted by recognizing
a right of inspection.
The right of inspection is provided by statute in a dozen states.6 2
Some states allow the members to inspect the union financial records at
will,"3 while others require the union to present each member with a report
of the financial activities of the union. 4 A few states require the union to
file a financial report with the office of the State Department of Labor6" or
tiff's Counsel, Dec. 5, 1968. U.S. v. Haverlick, 195 F. Supp. 331 (N.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd, 311 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1962), was the first cause of action under the Landrum-
Griffin Act not precluding a libel action.
60. Mooney v. Bartender's Union, 302 P.2d 866, vacated, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
61. Id.
62. ALA. CODE fit. 26, § 382 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-77 (Supp.
1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 477.07 (1966); HAWAII REV. LAwS § 90-11 (1955); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-806 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 146 § 7 (1967); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.21 (1966); N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 720-32 (McKinney 1965); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 661.040 (1967-68); CCH, STATE LAWS, S.C. 41,550, 42,060 (1966); S.D. CODE §
17.1105 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a(3) (1962); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.08 (1957) ; Smith, Select Aspects of the Wisconsin Empolyment Peace Act,
45 MARQ. L. REv. 338, 356-57 (1961-62). Statutes of this type have been upheld by the
states. AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; State Fed'n of Labor v.
McAdary, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944).
63. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 661.040 (1967-68).
64. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.21 (1966).
65. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 382 (1958).
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the Secretary of Labor."6
This type of reporting is generally required of private sector unions;
however, some statutes that were enacted to control the financial activities
of private sector unions have also been employed to control these activities
in public employee unions.67 The Massachusetts State Department of
Labor,"8 as a matter of practice, requires that a financial statement be
filed69 while New York does not, although both private and public
sector labor organizations are covered by the New York statute." The
New York act is divided into seven principal parts which include sections
dealing with: 1) the fiduciary obligations of officers and agents of
unions;" 2) specific prohibited financial interests and transactions;72
3) obligations of employers and others;7" 4) enforcement of fiduciary
obligations ;4 5) financial reporting;"' 6) accounting requirements ;"8
and 7) enforcement of financial reporting and accounting duties."7 The
act was adopted because experience had demonstrated that officers and
agents of some labor organizations abused their positions of fiduciary
responsibility. Experience had also shown that the efforts of labor to
correct abuses from within needed the aid and supplementation of
legislation."
Because public employers must operate under debt limitations and
account for their appropriations, they are not included within the re-
quirements of the New York act.' This limitation is significant; how-
ever, union regulation is the principal goal of this type of legislation and
therefore the limitation is not crucial to the regulatory scheme. A
66. S.D. CODE § 17.1105 (Supp. 1960).
67. This is accomplished by defining a labor organization in the Act as:
• . .any organization of any kind which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, or representing employees employed within the state of New York in deal-
ing with employers or employer organizations or with a state government, or
any political or civil subdivision or any agency thereof, concerning terms and
conditions of employment. .. ."
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 721(2) (McKinney 1965). An excellent summary of the effect of
this Act is contained in N.Y. DEPT. OF LABOR, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON THE LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IMPROPER PRACTICES ACT 1-10 (1968).
68. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 146 § 7 (1967).
69. Interview by phone with Thomas M. Raftery, Director of the Office of Busi-
ness Statistics, Massachusetts Department of Labor, Nov. 27, 1968.
70. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 721 (McKinney 1965).
71. Id. at § 722.
72. Id. at § 723.
73. Id. at § 724.
74. Id. at § 725.
75. Id. at § 726.
76. Id. at § 727.
77. Id. at § 728.
78. Id. at § 720.
79. Interview by phone with R. Gray, N.Y. Deputy Industrial Commissioner for
Legal Affairs, Nov. 27, 1968.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/3
UNIONIZED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
distinction does indeed exist within the relationship of private and public
sector employees, yet both experience the same difficulties where union
finances are concerned.
In addition to the statutes already mentioned, it can be argued that
existing laws are adequate as they pertain to the public sector. In 1967,
at the Red River Army Depot in Texarkana, Texas, a fraudulent petition
for the exclusive recognition of a union was submitted to a public
employer."0 The president of the local independent union representing
some employees at the depot submitted the petition to the personnel office,
allegedly containing the required number of names for exclusive recogni-
tion of a wage board unit. The fraudulent nature of the petition was
apparent on initial review because several names were entered in the
same handwriting and there were obvious misspellings of familiar names.
The employee refused to acknowledge these discrepancies although
additional investigations verified the initial finding that the petition was
not valid. As a result of charges filed in a district court,8" the employee
was found guilty of violating the federal law prohibiting intentional
falsification of a material fact in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States.82 The defendant was
found guilty of the charge and was fined $100. He also received a
six-month suspended sentence and was placed on active probation for one
year. Forthcoming administrative action could subject the defendant to
admonition or removal from the federal service. 3
Federal law prescribes a dues checkoff right" for federal govern-
ment employees whereby money is taken from the employees' pay and
transferred to the union. The entire financial structure of the union is
dependent upon these dues. On the authority of the case cited, 5 it seems
80. BNA, False Union Petition Results in Criminal Conviction for Army Employee,
238 GOv'T EMPLOYEE RELATIONS RE2. A-6, 7 (April 1, 1968).
81. Id.
82. It was claimed that the employee violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1965). The
statute states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ment or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
Id.
83. BNA, supra note 80.
84. The "right" to dues checkoff was created by Executive Order 10988, 3 C.F.R.
521 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V, 1964). There is some doubt, however,
whether this "right" is enforceable in court. BNA, Court Affirms Ruling that Judiciary
May Not Review Agency Applications of Executive Order io988, 267 GOV'T EMPLOYEES
RELATIONS REP. A-1 (Oct. 21, 1968).
85. BNA, supra note 80.
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clear that any pilfering or mismanagement of union funds would fall
within the prohibition of title 18 section 1001" since a party engaging
in these activities would be willfully concealing the manner in which
union funds are disbursed." It seems clear that section 1001 provides
federal employees with some protection from the unlawful actions of a
union official regarding monetary matters. One striking limitation regard-
ing the applicability of this section, however, is that it does not require
the union to file reports as does the Landrum-Grif fin Act. This makes the
discovery of illegal union activity significantly more difficult.
Section 1001 may also be applicable where an employee is entitled
to union membership under Executive Order 10988 and he is wrongfully
dismissed from the union. It would seem that the union officials dismissing
the member would have willfully concealed a material fact in a matter
within the jurisdiction of a department of the United States Govern-
ment."8 The fact that Executive Order 10988 requires a department to
consult with the union would put the matter within a department's juris-
diction because of its power to control its employees' relations. In this
manner section 1001 could be interpreted, as it already has been to a
certain degree, to preclude all forms of illegal acts perpetrated by a union,
union member or government official in a collective bargaining relation-
ship. This argument may provide the courts with a method to
expand an extremely limited provision to include the present confines
of the Landrum-Griffin Act, at least for criminal prosecutions. Its
extension to include the reporting requirements would be impractical
since successful prosecution would be difficult without the daily informa-
tion appearing in the reports.
While section 1001 has the potential for regulating the membership-
union relationship, it would seem unnecessary to expand the provision in
light of the procedure which has already been provided by the Landrum-
Griffin Act. Of course, the courts may conclude that the application of the
Landrum-Griffin Act to the regulation of public employee unions is more
desirable than an expansion of section 1001. An additional limitation of
section 1001 is that it does not provide a corresponding civil action,88 a
remedy available under the Landrum-Griffin Act. A civil action in tort
based upon a statutory violation, however, may be available under section
1001, but the present forms of action may prevent the inclusion of such
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1965).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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conduct."° Furthermore, an action directed at the government would not
be successful since the government has not granted its permission to be
sued under section 1001. The Landrum-Griffin Act would also be subject
to the latter limitation if public employees are included within its
coverage; however, its usefulness will not be fatally limited since the
principal thrust of the Act is toward intra-union activity as opposed to a
conspiracy between unions and employers against employees or illegal
acts perpetrated primarily by the employer.
A second example of existing law that has adequately coped with the
issue under consideration involves a Texas transit union. In Transit
Union v. Public Transportation Board,"' a private sector employer, the
owner of a transit system, had a collective bargaining agreement with the
union representing his employees. The agreement included a provision
establishing a pension fund financed by both employer and employee
contributions. A bank was made the trustee of the fund; however, the
administrative duties of the trust were performed by a committee consist-
ing of two management representatives and two union representatives.
Unresolved decisions within the committee were referred to binding
arbitration. In 1963, the City of Dallas, pursuant to a city ordinance,
bought the transit company but refused to recognize the union under the
pension plan. Thus, the trustee-bank was unable to ascertain its duties
as trustee and sought a declaratory judgment naming the company and
the union as defendants. The court held that since a public employer could
neither bargain collectively with a public employee union nor enter into an
agreement with such a union, the instrument creating the fund was of no
effect. The court went on to say, however, that it would be improper to
allow the public employer to have exclusive control over the administra-
tion of the trust contrary to the bilateral nature of the fund when it was
created. The court resolved the conflict by exercising its equity power of
deviation in dealing with trust instruments and ruled that if the public
employee union would refrain from striking, it could jointly administer
the pension fund with the public employer, if approved by the employees.
The use of trusts is a common method of controlling union funds.
It seems clear that whenever the misuse of a trust fund occurs, such
misuse may be challenged by seeking a declaratory judgment as was done
in the Transit Union case. Not only does the Transit Union decision
90. An excellent discussion of the difficulties which may be encountered is con-
tained in amur Prod. Corp. Iv. Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct.
1966). The decision provides a discussion of whether private citizens have an action in
tort for damages resulting from a strike by public employees. The court held that no
cause of action existed.
91. 69 L.R.R.M. 2177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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indicate that the declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy to
regulate the issue under discussion, but it is an illustration of how under-
lying public policy forms the basis for such regulation. The court, in bal-
ancing interests, held that the fair and reasonable control of the pension
fund was more important than the enforcement of a clearly drawn
statute prohibiting such an agreement. The equity powers of the court are
apparently broad enough to protect public employee union funds regard-
less of what legal theory is used and whether the attack is by a public
employer of the union whose conduct gave rise to the Landrum-Griffin
prohibitions. The broad protection afforded by the exercise of the court's
equity powers under the general public policy argument might also be
considered as limitless by other courts.
It seems clear that the law, even in the absence of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, furnishes an arsenal of remedies with which to curtail the
misuse of union monies. Under federal and state statutes and the common
law, the misuse of funds can be curtailed in the public sector; however, on
a large scale these methods are at best awkward. For example, requiring
public employee unions to report under the Landrum-Griffin Act would
avoid cumbersome criminal prosecutions required under federal law. In
addition, since most of the public employee unions are affiliates of
national labor organizations, a uniform reporting system would produce
simplified union regulation because only one reporting system-the
Landrum-Griffin method-would be in effect. Any state reporting pro-
cedure could produce fifty separate systems and result in the same
difficulties encountered prior to the Landrum-Griffin Act-no single
agency would be able to stay abreast of a union's financial dealings since
the information would be located in fifty different places. Similarly,
allowing this regulatory device to develop in equity rather than through
legislative action would result in the creation of fifty jurisdictional
interpretations, a result as undesirable as fifty separate reporting systems.
The uniformity that the Landrum-Griffin Act would bring to union
disclosure requirements would 'seem to provide the most pragmatic
solution.
CONCLUSION
After a decade under the Landrum-Griffin Act it appears that this
form of regulation is still necessary. Between 1961 and 1965 twenty-six
people were jailed each year for violations of the Act. 2 Furthermore,
approximately $463,000 were stolen from union related funds during the
92. Hearings on S. 731 & H.R. 5883 before the Sen. Subcomm. on Labor & Pub.
Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19 (1965).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/3
UNIONIZED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
same years."3 This is not intended to imply that the Act has been
unsuccessful; however, human frailties being what they are, persistence
is necessary in discovering the proscribed conduct.
An additional reason for using this form of regulation and extending
it to the public sector is the substantial increase in public employee union
wealth. The increased wealth was created by extending the right to have
union dues withheld by their employer and transferred to the union."4 It
has also been facilitated by granting public employers the power to enter
into union security agreements.9 5 Regulation is perhaps further justified
since unwilling as well as willing employees must participate in the dues
checkoff scheme in order to maintain their jobs. The extension of the
Landrum-Griffin Act to the public sector would serve to deter those
practices that the Act was originally designed to terminate.
The question of whether the Landrum-Griffin Act should be extended
to include public employers is met with the presence of existing federal
and state legislation and court decisions which presently, to a limited
degree, regulate public employers and their employees in certain Lan-
drum-Griffin type situations. Perhaps the principal agrument in favor of
extending the Landrum-Griffin Act, however, is that compliance would
furnish a common source for the data provided by the Act's reporting
requirement. This is not the case under the non-Landrum-Griffin regula-
tion of public employers and public employee unions since information is
so broadly dispersed that neither regional nor national misuse of public
employee union funds can be effectively detected. Because uniformity in
reporting is required to make the system workable in the public sector, it
would seem apparent that a Landrum-Griffin form of regulation would be
more functional than the methods presently being used.
Although public employee unions are specifically excluded by the
Act, this problem has been successfully resolved under the National Labor
Relations Act,"6 the Railway Labor Act" and right to work laws.98
In 1966 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to include
some public employees 9 and removed the state and political subdivision
exemptions with respect to employees of hospitals, institutions and
schools."" Thus, Congress is beginning to recognize that labor legislation
93. Id.
94. Members of the Professional Construction Inspector's Association of Detroit
were recently granted this right. JOURNAL OF COMMON COUNCIL OF DETROIT 673 (1967).
95. For example, agency shops are presently allowed in Detroit, Michigan. Joint
Common Council Resolution 2025 (1968).
96. See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text.
97. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
98. Potts v. Hays, 318 S.W.2d 826 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1958).
99. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966 § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. III, 1965-67).
100. Id. at § 203(d).
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cannot be divided into public and private sectors. In addition, the close
decisions involving the issue of whether workers are public or private
employees have been resolved in favor of the employee's inclusion within
labor legislation. 1' All of these situations.. 2 indicate a trend toward
including public employees within labor legislation. This trend is further
indicated by the treatment given by the Labor Management Office of
Reports to public employee unions, whose membership includes private
sector employees, that have misused union funds. Of course, the signific-
ance of this trend must be balanced against the Embry decision; however,
since the Labor Management Office of Reports has continued to apply
the Landrum-Griffin Act to public employee unions with private sector
employees and since the Embry decision did not specifically mention this
contention, although it was made, it can be maintained that the argument
is still viable. It is also suggested that the other reasons which support
the inclusion of public employee unions within the Act are not impugned
by Embry since they were not raised or rejected by the court. Stevens, of
course, could serve to clarify this entire area of the law.
Finally, the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Act indicates
that public employees were excluded because they lacked the mutuality
present in the private sector-the right to bargain collectively and enter
into collective bargaining agreements. The public employee collective
bargaining relationship is growing numerically02 and financially. 4 with
increasing support coming from the legislatures, the courts and at all
levels of government. 5 When the reason for the rule is no longer valid,
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Howard Johnson, 317 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1963).
102. Since some doubt has been raised as to the scope of the application of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, a familiar rule of statutory construction would apply:
A doubtful application of a statute will be controlled by the express language of
one or several other statutes which are wholly unrelated, but apply to similar
persons, things, or relationships ...
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 6102 (3d ed. 1943).
103. Over one million public employees are union members. Anderson, Labor Rela-
tions in Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 601.
104. An indication of the rapid financial growth of such groups can be clearly
demonstrated. Prior to the enactment of the Michigan Public Employee Labor Law in
1965, approximately $10,000 a year went to the union's coffers in Detroit through dues
checkoff. After the law was enacted, this figure increased to approximately $910,000 for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, and to approximately $1,025,000 for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1968. Interview with F. Demare, Deputy Controller of Detroit, in De-
troit, Michigan, Nov. 26, 1968. It should be noted that a substantial number of Detroit
public employee union members do not make their payments through dues checkoff. Id.
Thus, the sum which the unions in Detroit receive every year is substantially larger than
the figures stated above. The Detroit growth rate exists in spite of the prohibition that
wages may not be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining in Michigan, a distinct
deterrent to rapid union financial growth. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.193(8) (1965 Supp.).
105. For a discussion of this growth see Sullivan, supra note 11. Similar support is
also found in Canada and Australia. Sullivan, Canada: 20 Years of Public Employee
Collective Bargaining Experience-A S-,lution for the U.S.? 10 N.H. BAR J. 144 (1968) ;
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the rule itself should no longer be recognized. There seems to be no
clearer application than the Landrum-Griffin public employer exclusion.
Sullivan, Court Arbitration of Public Employee Labor Relations Disputes, 10 N.H. BAR
J. 84 (1968).
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